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From Symbiosis (kyôsei) 
to the Ontology of ‘Arising Both from Oneself and from Another’ (gûshô)1 
Hiroshi ABE
What kind of questions should philosophers inquire into these days? In the first 
section, I will attempt to resolve this issue by analysing main problem of this paper.
1. Main Problem 
Among the various ways of the being of existents, there is no doubt that a matter 
of tireless inquiry and the greatest interest since ancient times is the being of the one 
who makes the very inquiry, namely, that of human beings. However, it is quite obvious 
that this question regarding the being of human beings has taken a radical turn at 
present. 
Questions regarding the being of human beings would previously take forms 
such as, ‘What is man?’2 or ‘What is man’s place in the nature of things [(Sein)]?’3. 
The purpose of these questions was to find a definition of the essentia of human beings, 
in order to obtain ‘a unified idea of man’4, which could integrate an enormous variety 
of information concerning the being of human beings in philosophy, theology, human 
science, etc. Moreover, according to Scheler, this purpose could be accomplished by 
determining the uniqueness of the being of human beings in which it differs from other 
ways of being (e.g. the principle of ‘spirit’ (Geist)) and by demarcating a location for 
the domain of the being of human beings in Sein (i.e. the entire system comprising all 
the existents that consists of different fields of being). 
Needless to say, even approximately 80 years after Scheler’s death, such a 
question continues to be of great importance. In fact, it can be further said that the 
question has much more relevance now than it did in his times, because in all the 
sciences, even in the field of philosophy itself, there currently exists an incredible level 
of specialization as compared to the situation 80 years ago. 
_____________________________
1 In Japanese, both kyôsei and gûshô are written using the same Chinese character (i.e. 共生).
2 Max Scheler (tr. by Hans Meyerhoff), Man’s Place in Nature (New York: The Noonday Press, 3/1969), p. 
3.
3 Ibid. (The information within brackets is mine).
4 Ibid., p. 6.
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, this question has undergone a complete 
change at present, at the onset of the twenty-first century. 
With global environmental issues becoming increasingly serious in recent times, 
the question regarding the being of human beings is compelled to undergo a 
transformation. What kind of transformation does this question experience as a result of 
these issues and why?
In his book The Imperative of Responsibility, Hans Jonas states the following: 
‘The presence of man in the world had been a first and unquestionable given, from 
which all idea of obligation in human conduct started out. Now it has itself become an 
object of obligation: the obligation namely to ensure the very premise of all 
obligation’5. I would like to reply to the question under consideration by further 
elaborating upon this statement by Jonas.
Concerning the being of human beings, questions such as that by Scheler are, 
thus far, sufficient for our inquiry. Naturally, when we ask this traditional question, we 
presume the existence of an entire system comprising all the existents (Scheler’s 
concept of Sein) and human beings — if we could not presuppose the exsistentia of all 
the existents including human beings as a given, it would be impossible for us to 
inquire into the traditional question. Nevertheless, the current situation of human 
beings is such that both the being of human beings and that of other existents can no 
longer be considered an indubitable foundation because of the increasing menace of 
global environmental issues. In the face of such a situation, it is very likely that the 
question pertaining to the being of human beings must inevitably change. For, if we 
wish to ask the above-mentioned traditional question today, it is crucial for us to 
engage ourselves, first and foremost, in inquiring into how the presupposition can be 
secured on the basis of which the inquiry concerning the traditional one itself is 
possible. 
In this way, the question regarding the being of human beings has now changed 
from its traditional version to a modern one, for instance, how the existence of both 
human beings and the entire system of all the existents can be secured, which enables 
us to inquire into the former question itself. Along with this change, the original 
question’s characteristics also undergo a transformation — the uniqueness of the being 
of human beings is no longer under consideration. Therefore, on what aspect of the 
being of human beings does this new question focus? 
As everybody knows, every organism selectively draws matter and energy out of 
the environment for its own use, which it subsequently synthesizes or transforms for 
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5 Hans Jonas (tr. by H. Jonas in collaboration with David Herr), The Imperative of Responsibility — In 
Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 
p. 10.
the purpose of self-preservation, reproduction, etc. (anabolism). In return, it discharges 
useless matter and heat, which are the products of anabolic activity, into the 
environment (catabolism). These two activities (i.e. metabolism) of the organism 
depend on the cyclic flow of matter and energy in its own ecosystem, which is based on 
a metabolic system consisting of producer, consumer, and decomposer. Further, this 
cycle of matter in the ecosystem is itself dependent upon a larger system, such as the 
water cycle between the earth’s surface and the atmosphere and that of mineral 
nutrients between the land and the sea. Thus, the cycle of matter on earth forms the 
ultimate basis of being for all animate beings, who exist only because they have been 
cast into this worldwide circulation in nature from the beginning. 
We human beings, who live by means of both metabolism and Marx’s ‘social 
metabolism’ (a series of activities such as the development of resources, production, 
consumption and abandonment), are not exempted from this fundamental condition of 
being. Whether or not we are conscious of it, our existence requires being cast into the 
above-mentioned cycle of nature. It is impossible for us to deny this fact, since we 
cannot even make a denial of it without being based on such thrownness of the being of 
human beings. Therefore, the present-day question concentrates on the facticity of the 
being of human beings, who have been passively involved in the global circulation of 
nature from the outset. The moot question, as we have already seen, now inquires into 
the means by which the existence of human beings can be secured. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to ask again the above-mentioned 
question: What kind of question should philosophers inquire into today? My answer to 
this is as follows: contemporary philosophers should inquire into how the existence of 
both human beings and the entire system of existents can be secured, focusing on the 
fact that human beings have been cast into the cycle of nature. Thus, this paper aims at 
considering this new question pertaining to the being of human beings. In such a 
scenario, how should we begin this consideration?
In his final years, Georg Picht devoted himself to discussing a similar question, 
whereby he instituted a science called ‘human ecology’ that deals with ‘the conditions 
of human life on this planet’6. The present-day global ecological crisis caused by 
modern science motivated him to conceive of this new science. Faced with this difficult 
problem, he established a new standard of truth, which stressed that ‘what is useful to 
life is ‘fruitful’’7 and attempted to make ‘a revision of the fundamental concepts and 
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6 Georg Picht, ‘Ist Humanökologie möglich? [Is Human-ecology Possible?]’ in Humanökologie und Frieden 
[Human-ecology and Peace], ed. Constanze Eisenbart (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1979), p. 17.
7 Ibid., p. 32.
8 Ibid., p. 27.
methods which have carried the science up to now’8. Therefore, at the onset, human 
ecology raises the following question concerning science and the logos on which it is 
based:
‘If humankind makes itself the object of its science, that is, if it will apply the 
universal model of ecology to itself and build a ‘human ecology’…. Now, with 
its knowledge, it no longer stands beyond and outside the domain of the object 
which it investigates. It can no longer ignore the recognition that the projections 
of logos — the projections performed through technology — upon the biosphere 
change and often destroy this and that the logos itself is, therefore, an ecological 
first-rate determinative. This experience must lead to a revolution in the self-
understanding of the science. Namely, we can now no longer avoid the question 
whether the science itself, its theoretical model, its axioms and the attitude of 
humankind toward the nature which is sketched in them beforehand have a 
structure that is in harmony with the life conditions of humankind in this same 
nature or whether the word ‘science’ indicates a thought form which cannot be 
integrated into our ecosystem because of its structure’9. 
The first purpose of human ecology is this critical consideration of both science 
and the nature of its logos. Its second purpose lies in ‘the integration of human beings’ 
‘logos’ into the constitution of their ecosystem’10, that is, the conception of a new logos 
that can unite with the structure of the human ecosystem, since ‘human beings will only 
be able to survive in their ecosystem if they succeed in harmonizing their ‘logos’ with 
the fact that they are living things’11. 
Addressing these two purposes as our own tasks, which are, according to Picht 
himself, ‘a reflection on the structure of the model of world which is presupposed when 
we build theories and on its relation to the structure of our biosphere’12, we will 
endeavour to investigate the above question, namely, how can the existence of both 
human beings and the entire system of existents be secured? 
Thus, in this paper, we will first focus upon biological and ecological research 
on symbiosis in order to clarify the logos on which it is based, along with critically 
considering the nature of this logos itself. Second, instead of this logos, we intend to 
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9 Ibid., p. 21f. (italics mine).
10 Ibid., p. 66.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., p. 30.
present the idea of an alternative logos, which corresponds with the real fact of 
symbiosis as ‘the structure of our biosphere’, and ontology, which is founded on this 
new concept of logos and which, therefore, can potentially secure the existence of both 
human beings and the entire system of existents (Picht writes: ‘If human beings should 
contribute to their self-preservation, then they must acknowledge that an ecosystem lies 
in the balance of symbiosis, which permits no population to regard itself as the center 
of the whole system’13. This is why symbiosis is thematized in this paper as ‘the 
structure of our biosphere’). 
However, for achieving the above aim, it would be necessary to survey the 
history of biological (and ecological) research on symbiosis from the second half of the 
nineteenth century to the present day, in order to determine its fundamental trend, and 
from the research, learn about various concrete cases of symbiotic phenomena 
occurring in nature. We will perform such a survey in section two.
2. Historical Development of the Study of Symbiosis and Various Aspects of 
Symbiotic Phenomena
Let us provide a brief outline of the study of symbiosis in biology and ecology 
before describing its historical development. The term symbiosis can be roughly 
defined in three ways. For future discussion, we will refer to these three definitions as 
(a) ‘symbiosis’ (as its literal meaning — living together), (b) ‘mutualism in the narrow 
sense of the term’ and (c) ‘mutualism in the broad sense of the term’. Considering these 
definitions of the word, the history of symbiotic study can be understood as the process 
of change in the concept of symbiosis, to be more precise, the process of change from 
(a) to (b) to (c). What is implied by each of these three definitions? How and why has 
the change of definition occurred?
(a) It is said that the study of symbiosis in biology was triggered by the 
publication of Die Erscheinung der Symbiose (1879) by Anton DeBary, a German 
researcher of plant pathology. DeBary took into account examples of organisms of 
different species living together while maintaining close relationships with each other 
— physically and physiologically. (The best-known examples of this phenomenon are 
the relationships between the Actinia and the Paguroidea and between the Leguminosae 
and the leguminous bacterium). He coined the term Symbiose to refer to the 
relationship of organisms of different species living (bios) together (sym). The first 
definition of the term symbiosis (i.e. ‘symbiosis’) is ‘the living together of two 
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organisms in close association’14, in the above sense. It should be noted here that the 
required conditions for a symbiotic relationship, according to his definition, are as 
follows: (1) the ‘close association’ should be invariant and (2) the two species 
concerned should be ‘living together’, that is, the two species should be physically 
close to each other. 
(b) It would not be difficult for careful observers, however, to recognize that the 
two conditions presented above are not always necessary for two species to maintain a 
close physiological or behavioural relationship. For instance, although the 
entomophilous flowers and the insects that visit them maintain a ‘close association’ and 
depend upon each other regarding issues of vital importance such as propagation for 
the former and the main source of food for the latter, literal constancy is not regularly 
observed in their interaction, nor is physical closeness in a strict sense found between 
their respective habitats, with the exception of those that have established a so-called 
runaway co-evolutional relationship only with particular species, as seen in that of the 
fig and the fig wasp. In that case, what could be the factor that contributes to 
generating these ‘close associations’ between organisms of different species? At this 
stage, the perspective of cost and benefit is incorporated in the consideration of 
interspecific relationships (in present-day biology, such cost and benefit, in terms of the 
fitness of individuals or increase in population, are to be evaluated from the viewpoint 
of gene fitness). Following this, the above-mentioned factor can be identified as the 
reciprocal relationship between species, and the meaning of the term symbiosis is 
transformed into that pertaining to ‘an interaction between species that is beneficial to 
both’15. This becomes the second definition of the concept symbiosis, that is, mutualism 
in the narrow sense of the term, as presented in Les Commensaux et les Parasites 
(1875), written by Pierre van Beneden, a Belgian zoologist, four years before the 
publication of DeBary’s book. 
At the same time, an interesting fact has been pointed out regarding van 
Beneden’s presentation of mutualism in the narrow sense of the term in his book. While 
discussing mutual phenomena in the natural world, van Beneden deliberately 
capitalized the word ‘mutualists’. The reason behind this is thought to be that ‘the 
capitalization of “Mutualists” is probably an indirect reference to the “Mutualité” 
societies organized by workers in France and Belgium to support each other 
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14 Douglas H. Boucher, Sam James, and Kathleen H. Keeler, ‘The Ecology of Mutualism’ in Annual Review 
of Ecology and Systematics [= Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst.] 13, 1982, p. 315. 
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 317.
financially’16. Van Beneden played an active role in the 1830 revolution to win Belgian 
independence. It is supposed that this political experience in his youth made him 
sympathetic towards the labour movement. Therefore, the concept of mutualism in the 
narrow sense of the term, when it was first presented, was associated with socialism in 
a broad sense. This association was reinforced by Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution 
(1902), a representative book by Pyotr Alekseyevich Kropotkin, a famous Russian 
anarchist. As is generally known, Kropotkin attempted to illustrate in his book that 
Darwin’s theory of evolution did not theoretically justify the necessity of the struggle 
for existence in nature; however, it scientifically proved the importance of mutual aid, 
that is, mutualism in the narrow sense of the term, which was exclusive of any 
competitive factors.
Despite this attempt by Kropotkin, ‘mutualism has been avoided [among 
biologists and ecologists] during most of the twentieth century because of its 
association with left-wing politics (perhaps especially with Kropotkin)’17: It was not 
until the 1970s that mutualism was a subject for their consideration. However, this 
should not be understood merely as the consequence of the discrepancy between the 
freedom of the scientific stance from any dogma and a particular political ideology. In 
my opinion, the main factors leading to such a consequence should be noted as follows:
1. Dogma stating that it is competition that determines biological existence, such 
as that underlying Darwin’s theory of natural selection concerning inter-individual 
relationships in a population, was also applied to the study of interspecific relationships 
in the biotic community (typical examples of this are the Lotka-Volterra model and ‘the 
competitive exclusion principle’ of G. F. Gause, which were both advocated in the 
1920s and 1930s) and formed the basis of the above study (for instance, the theory of 
‘ecological niche’, which used to occupy a central position in the field of biocenology, 
is based on the competitive exclusion principle).
2. Furthermore, due to the anarchist connotation mentioned above, symbiosis as 
mutualism in the narrow sense of the term was understood to exist in a paradoxical — 
and therefore incompatible — relationship with competition, which is the negative 
interaction between two species. The transition between mutualism and competition 
was considered to be impossible. 
It is speculated that taking into account only these two factors, biological and 
ecological researchers were able to continue regarding mutualism as an exceptional 
phenomenon.
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17 Ibid., p. 318. (The information within brackets is mine).
(c) In contrast, a new trend of symbiotic study that first appeared in the field of 
ecology in either the 1970s or 1980s can be considered as having resulted from 
scepticism concerning the very factors mentioned above. According to the first factor, a 
synecological paradigm showing that the interspecific relation in the biotic community 
is established mainly through competition; these days, the counterargument for this is 
generally supported by means of a variety of experimental manipulations as follows: 
‘Ecologists have made significant advances in understanding community structure and 
function by focusing on negative interactions such as predation, competition, and 
physical disturbance…. However, positive interactions, such as facilitation and 
mutualism, also play pivotal roles in organizing communities, and incorporating 
positive interactions into ecological theory can fundamentally alter our understanding 
of the processes and mechanisms that shape communities’18.
One interesting example providing evidence that ‘mutualisms have large effects 
on community structure and function’19 is the interaction between marine fishes such as 
salmonids and terrestrial trees lining the banks of rivers and streams.
‘Juvenile salmonids spend up to two years feeding in freshwater streams and 
rivers before migrating to marine waters, where they mature and gain nearly all 
of their biomass, after which they return to their natal habitats to spawn and die. 
Trees subsidize production in these streams with the input of nutrients, leaf litter, 
and woody debris that supports higher populations of aquatic invertebrates, the 
main food source for juvenile salmon…. At the landscape scale, forested streams 
typically support up to three times more salmon than unforested streams…. 
Salmon, thus, benefit from living in streams surrounded by trees, but the benefit 
is not unidirectional. Spawning salmon migrations inject huge amounts of 
marine-derived nitrogen, carbon, and phosphorous into relatively nutrient-
starved systems. … As a result, annual forest growth per unit area can be up to 
three times higher in forests adjacent to salmon spawning sites…. Furthermore, 
this subsidy of nutrients may alter the competitive balance among tree species’20.
With respect to the second factor, the following scepticism is presented regarding 
one of its underlying assumptions — the impossibility of inter-transition between 
mutualism and competition (a similar skepticism is also presented regarding another 
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18 Mark E. Hay et al., ‘Mutualisms and Aquatic Community Structure: The Enemy of my Enemy is my 
friend’ in Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics 35, 2004, p. 175f. (italics mine).
19 Ibid., p. 176.
20 Ibid., p. 190f.
assumption, the antinomy of mutualism and competition, as is shown later): ‘Mutualists 
in one ecological setting can be adversaries in another setting… conversely, 
interactions traditionally viewed as antagonistic can be mutualistic, depending on 
environmental and community settings’21. The reason for this is as follows:
‘Most ecology textbooks devote much space to the classification of species 
interactions. Regarding the interactions of two species, if we symbolize as ‘+’ 
the case in which the effect caused by one of the species increases the 
proliferation rate of population and fitness of individual in the other species, the 
opposite case as ‘-’, and the case which is neither as ‘0’, … then, according to 
this classification, each interaction corresponds to only one combination of 
symbols, for example, competition is (- -) and predation is (+ -). While such a 
classification based on a one-to-one correspondence is clear and straightforward, 
it often ignores the variability of interactions by emphasizing their average 
consequences. However, because the consequence of interactions is determined 
by the balance between cost and benefit, it can be reversed when the cost and the 
benefit change according to the ecologic condition…. What should be noted here 
is that a classification based on average consequences is in danger of 
overestimating one aspect of the interspecific relationship and that, therefore, 
the greater the variability becomes, the more unreliable such a classification 
becomes’22. 
In other words, ‘interspecific relationships are not always invariant but can 
change dynamically according to changes in time or space’23. The classification of 
interspecific relationships is nothing more than an abstraction used by biologists. Due 
to such variability, an interspecific relationship is competitive when the benefit for the 
two species concerned is lower than the cost, while it becomes mutualistic when the 
former exceeds the latter24. Thus, the third definition of the term symbiosis emerges, 
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21 Ibid., p. 176.
22 Takayuki Ôgushi, ‘Kotaigun kara shukankankei he [From Population to Interspecific Relationship]’ in 
Chikyûkyôseikei to wa nanika [What is Global Symbiotic System?] ed. Masahiko Higashi and Takuya Abe 
(Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992), p. 202. (italics mine).
23 Ibid., p. 201.
24 For instance, we can postulate a circumstance in which A, a predator, preys on two species, B and C. B 
and C are eventually involved in a relation wherein either one’s increase in population results in an increase 
in that of A, the predator, which leads to a higher predation pressure, thus causing a decrease in the other’s 
population. In this situation, the relation between B and C is competitive, because both of the species suffer 
a loss by being victims to the predation. This is, in turn, because their indirect interactions promote the 
propagation of the common predator. Such a relationship is referred to as ‘apparent competition’ by
that is to say, ‘interspecific interactions in which the benefits exceed the costs for both 
participants’25.
To understand this third definition, it should be noted that ‘interspecific 
interactions in which the benefits exceed the costs for both participants’ are ‘the 
relationships in which the two species concerned use each other’s existence for their 
respective benefit, not those in which each of the species gains the identical benefit or 
cost’26. Based on this explanation, agriculture, for example, can be perceived as 
mutualism because it involves ‘a mutualistic interaction between humans and 
domesticated plants’27, and similar relationships are also found in cultivation, 
stockbreeding, aquaculture, etc. Considering the various interspecific relationships of 
this type in nature, it could certainly be said that ‘the earth is full of mutualistic 
relationships’28. This is why we describe the third definition as mutualism in the broad 
sense of the term.
As shown in the examples of ‘apparent competition’ and ‘apparent mutualism’29, 
the effects that one species can have on the other solely through an intermediary in the 
form of a third species (like A in the previous example) or a fourth or fifth plays an 
important role in the species interaction pertaining to mutualism in the broad sense of 
the term (as seen in the relationship between B and C in the previous example). The 
effects that ‘require the presence of intermediary species in order to arise’30 are named 




   This apparent competition between B and C, however, changes into a mutualistic relationship as soon as 
A’s ‘switching’ of the food preference occurs in such a way that it preferentially preys on only the species 
that has a larger population. This means that A preys only on B when B’s population increases. 
Consequently the predation pressure for C decreases, which results in an increase in its proliferation rate. 
Thereafter, the switching occurs again, prompting A to prey exclusively on C, this time, while the 
reproductive rate of B increases. In this situation, therefore, B and C develop a mutual relationship through 
their alternate self-sacrifice for each other. This relationship is called ‘apparent mutualism’ in ecology. 
25 Hay et al., op. cit., p. 176.
26 Hiroyuki Matsuda, Kyôsei to wa nanika — sakushu to kyôsô wo koeta seibutsudôshi no daisan no kankei 
[What is Symbiosis? — the third relationship of organisms which is beyond exploitation and struggle] 
(Tokyo: Gendaishokan, 1995), p. 23. 
27 Ibid., p. 57.
28 Makoto Katô, ‘Seibutsu no kyôsei kara mita shizen [Nature Viewed from Symbiosis of Organisms]’ in 
Kankyô toshiteno shizen, shakai, bunka [Nature, Society and Culture as Environment] ed. Kôgaku Arifuku 
(Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 1997), p. 61. 
29 Cf. fn. 24.
30 J. Timothy Wootton, ‘The Nature and Consequences of Indirect Effects in Ecological Communities’ in 
Ann. Rev. Ecol. Syst. 25, 1994, p. 444.
which is ‘a result of a physical interaction between two species’31: the former arises 
only in multi-species assemblages, while the latter ‘would occur between a pair of 
species both in isolation and within multi-species communities of varying 
composition’32.
After studying such indirect effects, present day ecologists have discovered 
definite evidence against the second assumption mentioned above, the antinomy of 
mutualism and competition. Natural communities demonstrate competitive interactions 
between two species that ‘are still antagonistic from a pairwise perspective but become 
mutualistic when imbedded within the nexus of community interactions’33.
A good example of such interactions is included in Michio Hori’s research 
concerning scale-eating cichlids. 
‘Congeneric species of scale-eating cichlids may benefit each other even though 
they share the same prey. These predatory fishes consume the scales of other 
living fish using a species-specific approach and attack sequence. In two 
congeneric species, attack success was greater when in the presence of the 
congeneric, but not conspecific, scale eaters…. Presumably, prey fish were 
unable to be as vigilant against multiple attack strategies. Thus, two species 
using a similar resource (scales on a given fish) facilitated, rather than interfered 
with, each other’s success’34.
While tracing the process of change in the concept of symbiosis, we have briefly 
surveyed the history of symbiotic study in biology and ecology. It can be summarized 
as follows:
1) In nature, not only two species that are physically close to each other or 
whose physiological or behavioural relationships can be easily recognized but also two 
apparently unrelated species that are far from each other, such as trees in the forest and 




33 Hay et al., op. cit., p. 185.
 
34 Ibid., p. 189. Hori also reported other interesting observations: ‘Mutualism also may occur among 
individuals within a species, as exemplified by frequency-dependent selection in the scale eater Perissodus 
microlepis. Individual P. microlepis have asymmetrical mouthparts and corresponding attack strategies: 
“right-handed” individuals have mouthparts oriented to the right and attack the left side of their prey; “left-
handed” individuals have mouthparts oriented to the left and attack the right side of their prey. Deviations 
from an even ratio of morphs within a population resulted in lower attack success in the dominant morph…. 
These observations suggest that these two morphs act mutually to increase attack success by decreasing 
prey-fish alertness for attacks from one side or the other’ (ibid.).
the salmon in the sea, can have indirect mutualistic relationships. As implied by this, 
‘all of the species in the global ecosystem are, after all, in direct and indirect 
mutualistic relationships’35. Furthermore, ‘because matter circulates in the ecosystem, 
indirect effects reach throughout the earth through the inorganic environment’36, all 
living things on earth (including human beings) are in such mutualistic relationships.
2) The mutualistic relationships stated above are not invariable and fixed, 
determined solely between the two species concerned. As suggested in the example 
regarding apparent competition and apparent mutualism, the mutualistic relationships 
can easily change according to the context of the whole interspecific interactions of the 
two species, which are multiple because each can have mutual relationships with any 
other species.
3) In addition, this interaction between the two species is not merely limited to a 
dichotomy such as ‘either competition or mutualism’ or ‘either friend or foe’; it can 
principally transcend such an ‘either-or’ relationship, as is clearly shown in the above 
instance of scale-eating fish. In other words, it is a relationship that can be both 
competitive and mutualistic.
As elucidated thus far, indirect effects enable the occurrence of the above-
mentioned interactions (from 1 to 3) between species. It can be said, therefore, that 
these very indirect effects are quite essential for the occurrence of symbiotic 
phenomena in nature.
This is well-demonstrated in the fact that the present research on symbiosis in 
ecology focuses on the indirect effects. In such a situation, how can indirect effects be 
explained at present? Can the logos, which underlies ecology and the real fact of 
symbiosis, and the indirect effects that are studied in ecology correspondent with each 
other? These questions will be examined in the next section. 
3. The ‘Logos’ of Ecology 
With regard to the first question, Masahiko Higashi, a Japanese ecologist, 
explains the method of research regarding indirect effects as follows:
‘The term indirect effect generally refers to whatever “effect” that is transmitted 
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from one to another through a mediator. …Recognized only through the logical 
chain which traces that of cause and effect, indirect effect is essentially invisible. 
…One of the clues to solve this problem is, paradoxically, found in the very 
characteristic of the indirect effect that “it is recognized only by tracing the chain 
of logic”. In other words, it can be said that an understanding of the indirect 
effect is essentially a theoretical problem and that indirect effects within a 
certain system can be defined and elucidated only by means of the theoretical 
model of the causal network. …However, because each phenomenon requires its 
own formulation based on the corresponding type of theoretical model, it is 
necessary to use a mathematical method to investigate indirect effects in every 
different type of model’37. 
In the above citation, it is stated that in ecology, an inquiry regarding the indirect 
effect is a ‘theoretical problem’ that should be clarified ‘mathematically’, based on a 
‘theoretical model of the causal network’. However, would it be possible to estimate 
the indirect effects of interspecific interactions as they exist in nature by means of such 
a mathematical method? Would we not risk distorting a phenomenon in the natural 
world by imposing a logos upon it that is fundamentally different from that of the very 
phenomenon, even if we happened to succeed in explaining it by applying the 
theoretical model, for example, the hypothesis preformed through experimental 
manipulations? Such questions will acquire a greater degree of significance if we 
consider the history of human errors that have led to unexpectedly adverse effects. 
Such effects have resulted from our intervening with the ecosystem, while aiming at 
achieving certain desired effects based on simulations of theoretical models, as shown 
in Silent Spring by Rachel Carson. To quote from Picht once again, we ‘can no longer 
ignore the recognition that the projections of logos — the projections performed 
through technology — upon the biosphere change and often destroy this, and that the 
logos itself is, therefore, an ecological first-rate determinative’.
After considering the above problem, we will critically examine two 
representative methods of research pertaining to indirect effects in current 
biomathematics.
First, we will consider a method using a matrix as follows: ‘There is a popular 
and useful basic theory which enables us to evaluate indirect effects through the 
evaluation of direct effects. …Arrange all species having direct effects vertically and 
all of those that are affected horizontally, in order to draw a chart (matrix) of direct 
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effects produced by respective pairs. From the inverse matrix of this, you can evaluate 
indirect effects’38. Naturally enough, however, this method of calculating indirect 
effects is based on the assumption that all direct effects existing in the interactions of 
every organism in the biotic community have been evaluated. In addition, if ‘it is 
theoretically necessary to evaluate the direct effects of the interactions of the entire 
species on the earth because all of the species in the community have indirect effects 
not only on one another but also on the whole earth’39, it is ‘virtually impossible’40, as 
Matsuda himself states, to reveal the actual nature of indirect effects by means of this 
method.
The second method under examination is ‘path analysis’, which is ‘a statistical 
approach that estimates the degree to which changing a causal variable will affect a 
dependent variable through both direct and indirect pathways’41. A detailed explanation 
of this method is given below: 
‘The path analysis approach is a method which allows us to understand direct 
and indirect effects quantitatively by distributing correlations among variables in the 
multivariate system, the causal relations of which have been clarified. …In this 
method, a model named ‘path diagram’ should be made before beginning analysis. In 
making the model, we connect one variable to another by drawing arrows (paths) which 
indicate causal relations or temporal successions. The magnitude of the direct effect of 
a path is expressed as a standardized partial regression coefficient of multiple 
regression, which is called ‘path coefficient’. A path which leads from one variable to 
another variable through various arrows shows the indirect effect of the former on the 
latter and its magnitude is calculated by multiplying all of the path coefficients of the 
respective arrows’42. 
However, as long as the basic premise is that the causal relationships among 
variables, the objects of analysis, ‘have been clarified’, path analysis contains a 
problem which is similar to that of the first method: ‘As the complexity of a causal 
model increases, sample sizes must also increase. This may limit the application of this 
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39 Ibid. (italics mine).
40 Ibid.
41 Wootton, op. cit., p. 457f. 
42 Izumi Washitani, ‘Shokubutsu no hanshoku to seibutsukan sôgosayô [Plant Propagation and Biotic 
Interactions]’ in Samazamana kyôsei — seibutsushukan no tayôna sôgoriyô [Various Symbiosis — 
Diversified Interspecific Interactions] ed. T. Ohgushi (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1992), p. 126f.
approach in complex systems’43. Moreover, a more serious problem of this method has 
been pointed out: ‘Because path analysis is related to traditional linear regression 
techniques, which assume unidirectional causality, it is unclear whether it can 
adequately handle reciprocal effects’44. It is evident, therefore, that this approach is 
also inappropriate for understanding the reality of indirect effects among organisms.
Why are these mathematical analyses unable to show us the indirect effect as it 
occurs? It is because, in our opinion, both of these methods basically follow a 
procedure in which (1) initially, the indirect effect is reduced to the direct effects 
between two species, which are understood only as linear and unilateral effects between 
species — in other words, as those picked out of an entire context of linked interactions 
between all species in the community and (2) the indirect effect is reconstructed by 
summing up these direct effects. (This can be regarded as a method based on the ‘four 
rules of logic’ advocated by Descartes in his Discourse on Method). 
In that case, why do ecologists adopt such methods? As indicated by Higashi’s 
above-mentioned comment that an indirect effect is ‘recognized only through the chain 
of logic which traces that of cause and effect’, ecologists adopt such methods in an 
attempt to understand all kinds of interspecific relationships by solely considering the 
model of the causality of two species as a linear and unidirectional interaction. This 
view held by ecologists is based on the hidden premise that the cause exists 
independently of the effect. This is because, if the cause and the effect in the causality 
were not different from each other but were identical and continuous, the effect of the 
cause would plainly be the same as the cause itself; in other words, no differing effect 
would arise from the cause, and therefore, no causality would exist. If we define an 
autogenous occurrence as ‘arising from oneself’ and a heterogenous one as ‘arising 
from another’, then we can give another interpretation to the above-mentioned premise 
of ecologists — causality should be arising from another, not arising from oneself.
This, however, suggests that the above premise is located in the logical space 
dominated by binaries such as ‘either arising from another (i.e. the existence of 
causality) or arising from oneself (i.e. the non-existence of causality)’. In accordance 
with Tokuryû Yamanouchi, a Japanese philosopher of the Kyoto school, we name this 
bivalence of ‘either affirmation or negation’ ‘logos’. Subsequently, we can say that the 
logos that underlies ecology is none other than ‘logos’ as a binary logic.
Now that the logos of ecology has been clarified in this manner, we should 
consider the second question: does ‘logos’ correspond to the indirect effect?
We already have the answer to this question. Although ‘logos’ is equivalent to 
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the above-mentioned causal relationship between the two species (i.e. the abstract 
direct effect that is separated from the linked interactions among all the species in the 
community for the purpose of adapting to the ‘logos’), it does not correspond to the 
interrelationships among organisms in nature, which are controlled by indirect effects. 
This is because such relationships cannot be linear and one-way causal relationships — 
for example, the causalities of a case in which species A (which is the cause) has 
existed independently of species B (which is affected) before A has any effect on B.
Let us reformulate our discussion thus far. As shown in the above-mentioned 
ecological studies of symbiosis, when species Y has an effect on species Z, more 
precisely, when Y has an influence on every species in the community, and ultimately, 
on the earth through its effect on Z, Y is constantly affected either directly or indirectly 
by every other species, including Z. Otherwise, it would be impossible for Y to exist in 
nature. (This manner of existence also underlies the above-stated characteristic of 
thrownness of the being of human beings). If Y depends on Z to such a degree that Y 
cannot have any effect on Z until Z exists, the causal relationship between Y and Z can 
be regarded as an effect of Z on itself. In this sense, this causality can be said to be 
arising from oneself. Nevertheless, as long as Y and Z are different from each other, 
any effect of the former on the latter should be thought of as arising from another. In 
such a case, is the effect of Y on Z arising from oneself or arising from another?
If we attempt to answer this question by strictly adhering to reality, we have to 
say that the effect neither arises from oneself nor from another — or that it arises both 
from oneself and from another. This means that the above interaction of Y and Z, which 
is controlled by the indirect effect (i.e. relationship between the two species in nature), 
cannot be understood by means of a ‘logos’ based on binary logic. 
In that case, what kind of logos can be appropriately applied to the indirect 
effect, the reality of symbiotic phenomena in nature, and new ontology founded on this 
alternative logos? We will answer this question in the subsequent concluding section.
4. The Logic of Lemma and the Ontology of ‘Arising Both from Oneself and from 
Another’ (gûshô)
First, we shall inquire into why ‘logos’ cannot correspond with indirect effects. 
If we recall the example of the effect of Y on Z or the above instance of scale-eating 
cichlids, this question can be easily answered: it is because ‘logos’ has only two values 
— ‘x’ and ‘non-x’ —, and therefore, it is impossible to acknowledge the existence of an 
intermediate between them (i.e. the law of the excluded middle). However, since 
indirect effects rule in nature, there can also be something which is ‘both x and non-x’ 
(e.g. to arise both from oneself and from another) or ‘neither x nor non-x’ (e.g. to arise 
neither from oneself nor from another). 
If this is so, then the suitable logos for indirect effects would undoubtedly be 
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based — not on the law of the excluded middle which is the basis for the ‘logos’ — but, 
— neologically speaking —, on ‘the law of the included middle’. In the following 
consideration of the characteristics of such a new logos, we can derive a clue from T. 
Yamanouchi’s interpretation of Naˉgaˉrjuna’s Muˉlamadhyamakakaˉrikaˉ (Treatise 
Concerning the Middle, in Japanese,『中論』). In his study, Yamanouchi writes as 
follows:
‘The law of contradiction forbids strictly both affirmation and negation from 
being valid at the same time. Therefore, [Western] logos declares not only that 
judgment should be either affirmative or negative but also that it cannot be 
otherwise, for example, the intermediate and the third. But Naˉgaˉrjuna’s 
philosophy, in contrast, dares to posit ‘the middle’ and advocates the middle way 
[of logical thinking]. This is the reason why his main work is entitled ‘Treatise 
Concerning the Middle’ or ‘Treatise Concerning the Intuition of the Middle’…. 
Obviously, the thought of ‘the middle’ is central to his position. It may be 
probably sage to acknowledge that this means the reverse of the law of the 
excluded middle'45. 
In such a context, how does such logic as can be found in ‘the reverse of the law 
of the excluded middle’ appear in this Treatise Concerning the Middle? 
In general, the type of statement that consists of four phrases is called ‘tetra-
lemma’ (in Japanese, 四句分別 or 四論). It is well-known that the Treatise Concerning 
the Middle contains a number of odes in the tetra-lemma form46. In essence, however, 
we can divide them all into two ideal types47. 
A: S is (1) neither P (2) nor non-P (3) nor ‘both P and non-P’ (4) nor ‘neither P 
nor non-P’.
B: S is (1) either P (2) or non-P (3) or ‘both P and non-P’ (4) or ‘neither P nor 
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46 Among all the odes in Treatise Concerning the Middle, which are approximately 450 in number, over 80 
have a tetra-lemma form (including those that are abridged and imperfect). Cf. Musashi Tachikawa, Kû no 
kôzô — Chûron no ronri [The Structure of Sunyata — The Logic of Muˉlamadhyamakakaˉrikaˉ] (Tokyo: 
Daisanbunmeisha, 1986), p. 132.
        
47 Cf. ibid., p. 131.
non-P’. 
Thus, this typical example of Naˉgaˉrjuna’s argument, in accordance with tetra-
lemma, refers to ‘the cases of (1) affirmation, (2) negation, (3) both affirmation and 
negation, and (4) neither affirmation nor negation’48. According to Yamanouchi, such 
an argument can be regarded as an expression of ‘the logic which does not exclude but 
includes the middle, if we classify these [i.e. the third and fourth cases] into ‘the 
middle’’49.
However, the following question arises at this point: what kind of reasoning 
justifies the reverse of the law of the excluded middle in Naˉgaˉrjuna’s logic, which is 
composed of four lemmas — affirmation, negation, both affirmation and negation, and 
neither affirmation nor negation? Concerning this aspect, Yamanouchi explains: ‘I 
transpose the third and fourth [lemmas], in order to take “neither affirmation nor 
negation” as the third lemma and “both affirmation and negation” as the fourth one. I 
think that “neither affirmation nor negation” is at the core of the whole logic [of 
Naˉgaˉrjuna]…. It is “ neither affirmation nor negation” that opens up the viewpoint of 
“ the middle”. Without grounding on this lemma, “both affirmation and negation” would 
be impossible’50. If this is so, how does the third lemma of ‘neither affirmation nor 
negation’ render the standpoint of ‘the middle’ possible?
Needless to say, a remarkable characteristic of ‘neither affirmation nor negation’ 
is that this lemma is not only a negation of affirmation but also a negation of negation. 
In fact, it is easy for us to understand what is implied by ‘negation of affirmation’, but 
what could ‘negation of negation’ possibly mean? Yamanouchi replies as follows:
‘The answer to this question is that this negation [of negation] alone is 
meaningless and that it cannot be meaningful without its close relation to other 
lemmas. …Seemingly, it may be nothing but a duplication of negation. But in 
substance, it turns the second lemma toward the first one and combines them. …
Because ‘negation of negation’, which is no simple negation, makes negation 
approach affirmation and relieves it from being hopeless denial. If there is 
126 Hiroshi ABE
_____________________________
48 Yamanouchi, op. cit., p. 71. 
49 Ibid., p. 70. (The information within brackets is mine). Naturally, in contrast to Yamanouchi’s 
interpretation, there exists another version that states, ‘fundamental laws of formal logic, such as that of 
contradiction and that of the excluded middle are obeyed in the tetra-lemma of Muˉlamadhyamakakaˉrikaˉ’ 
(Tachikawa, op. cit., p. 132.). However, it is not necessary for us to demonstrate which argument is correct. 
As stated above, the main intention of this paper is to conceptualize the logos in such a way as to transcend 
the dichotomy resulting from the law of the excluded middle. This is why our present consideration focuses 
on Yamanouchi’s interpretation.
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neither affirmation nor negation, what remains? Common sense appears to 
indicate that there is nothing but pure nihility. Nevertheless, or rather therefore, 
there arises a world where both affirmation and negation are negated: it can be 
not only affirmation but also negation because it is neither. It is nothing but the 
world of the fourth lemma’51. 
The crux of Yamanouchi’s explanation is that ‘negation of negation’ means a 
denial of the very dichotomy inherent in ‘either affirmation or negation’ and that only 
the abandonment of bivalence in ‘neither affirmation nor negation’ makes ‘both 
affirmation and negation’ possible, which is none other than the standpoint of ‘the 
middle’, because it builds bridges between affirmation and negation and enables both 
of them to coexist. 
According to Yamanouchi, Naˉgaˉrjuna’s logic is the tetra-lemma to which the 
third lemma is central, which is ‘not mere negation but lies at least in a complex 
connection between affirmation and negation and enables negation itself to evoke a 
new affirmation’52. In reference to this, we will use the term ‘the logic of lemma’, in 
Yamanouchi’s words. Therefore, we can regard the lemma itself as a form of logos 
which is capable of corresponding to the indirect effect. 
In such a situation, based on this logic of lemma, what should we consider ‘the 
ontology of life’ that corresponds to the reality of symbiosis? In conclusion, I would 
like to outline my own opinion pertaining to this problem.
In projecting such ontology (logos of being), our fundamental aim is not to 
elucidate the being of human beings and of living things within the framework of the 
existing principle of explanation but to see the structure (logos) of the reality of life on 
earth (including human beings) as it exists. 
If we recognize that all natural organisms mutually depend on one another in 
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52 Ibid., p. 191. On the contrary, the above logic cannot be directly found in Treatise Concerning the 
Middle. ‘Naˉgaˉrjuna’s logic of sunyata primarily implies radical negation of the fourth lemma [i.e. “neither 
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Commentary on Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana (『大乗起信論』)]’ in Indogaku-
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from the latter to the former, is Wonhyo, a priest in the seventh century Silla Kingdom who was known as a 
representative of early Korean Buddhism. In his commentary on Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the 
Mahayana, Wonhyo ‘argues that absolute negation is absolute affirmation by interpreting “one soul [i.e. the 
soul of all sentient beings]” as the fourth lemma [i.e. “neither affirmation nor negation”] and “two aspects 
of the soul [i.e. ‘the soul as suchness” and “the soul as birth-and-death”]” as “both suchness and birth-and-
death”, which corresponds to the third lemma, and then understanding that one soul and its two aspects are 
one and the same’ (ibid., p. 10f. The information within brackets is mine).
direct or indirect relationships, presented above in the ecological research on symbiosis 
and in the example regarding the effect of Y on Z, then it would be impossible to find 
an organism in nature that could have arisen from itself. This is because it is impossible 
for A to exist in nature independently of B, in other words, to be as substantia. Without 
B,
A would not be as A itself. Correspondingly, does every living thing in nature 
exist in such a manner of arising from another as is seen in the above-mentioned linear 
and one-way causality? The answer would be in the negative — when A is dependent 
on B, it would be incorrect to think that B already exists as substantia before A, that is, 
without any relation to A, for it is only when B also is reliant upon A that B exists as 
itself. 
In short, the being of life in nature is neither arising from oneself nor from 
another. In other words, A and B do not exist in a way similar to substantia; therefore, 
the mutual relationship between both does not correspond with the relationship between 
substantiae either. Hence, as long as we accept the ontology of substantia, we can 
provide no other expression to describe the being of living things apart from ‘[arising] 
from a non-cause’53 in Naˉgaˉrjuna’s words.
In contrast, Naˉgaˉrjuna raises the following query: ‘Whatever existent that is 
established through contingence, how can that, if it is not yet established, be 
contingent?’54 As mentioned by Naˉgaˉrjuna, without the substantial being of each 
organism, the above-stated mutual relationships in nature would not be possible. If A 
did not exist before B, it would be impossible for B to exist as dependent on A and vice 
versa. That is to say, as its own condition of possibility, the mutual dependence of A 
and B necessarily requires the substantial being of the two. Seen from this perspective, 
the interaction between A and B is such that one is as substantia (in other words, one 
has arisen from itself), and then, by depending upon this fact (that is, by the fact of 
having arisen from another), the other also exists. Given this condition, it is necessary 
to regard the being of living things as arising both from oneself and from another. 
Even if, as mentioned above, the interaction between A and B in nature is based 
upon the being of the two, which implies arising both from oneself and from another, it 
is obvious that this kind of being of A and B prevents their mutual dependence from 
being realized. This is because their mutual dependence is made possible by their 
existence as arising from a non-cause. Thus, we can conclude that the being of every 
organism in nature is arising both from oneself and from another, even though or rather 
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just because it is arising from a non-cause, and that the ontology of life corresponding 
with the reality of symbiosis is, therefore, none other than that of arising both from 
oneself and from another — which aims to elucidate the structure (logos) of being, 
namely, that of arising both from oneself and from another combined with arising from 
a non-cause.
Without doubt, in order to arrive at the concrete content of this new ontology, it 
is important for us to learn a great deal from not only the latest ecological research 
pertaining to different symbiotic phenomena in nature but also the latest theoretical 
analysis of biomathematics (e.g. the theory of a complex adaptive system55), which 
attempts to explain the mechanism of symbiotic phenomena as it occurs. From such a 
study, we could formulate a perfect answer to the question regarding the being of 
human beings, or how the existence of both human beings and the entire system of 
existents can be secured.
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